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This article explores the media and journalists' influence - power and role - 
especially in crisis reporting during the last decades since Vietnam War. Is the media 
independent operator or carried out by political leaders and other opinion makers who 
are defining the agenda for journalists? Can media be a tool for political leaders, when 
they prepare their nation to the war?  
The article examines the role of media in the internal development of 
Yugoslavia in 1980's, and tries to find answers weather journalists understood 20 years 
ago, ie in the late 1980s, that the country was rapidly slipping into a civil war? Would it 
have prevented the crisis in the Balkans, if the journalists had acted differently? Have 
journalists contributed to the progression of the crisis?  What role the war propaganda 
played in 1980ies and 1990ies?  
Article will also touch the ethical issues of journalism. Do journalists 
understand the content of their power. Do they know how to use this tool in a more 
cautious way? 
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Ovaj članak istražuje medijski i novinarski utjecaj, odnosno njihovu snagu i 
ulogu, posebno u kriznim izvješćima tijekom zadnjeg desetljeća od Vijetnamskog rata. 
Je li medij neovisan operator ili to obavljaju politički vođe ili drugi stvaraoci mišljenja koji 
određuju dnevni red za novinare. Može li medij biti alat za političke vođe kad 
pripremaju svoju naciju za rat? 
Ovaj članak istražuje ulogu medija u unutarnjem razvoju Jugoslavije u 1980-
ima i pokušava naći odgovore jesu li novinari razumjeli prije dvadeset godina, npr. 
kasnih osamdesetih, da zemlja srlja u građanski rat? Bi li spriječilo krizu na Balkanu da su 
se novinari ponašali drukčije? Jesu li novinari doprinijeli razvoju krize? Koju je ulogu 
imala ratna propaganda u 1980-ima i u 1990-ima? 
Članak će se također dotaći pitanja etičnosti novinara. Razumiju li novinari koju 
moć imaju? Znaju li kako koristiti ovaj instrument na pažljiviji način? 
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During the last decade, media and the power of media have been 
under a lively debate in many countries. The public debate has tried to 
define weather media can be so powerful that even the political decision 
makers will formulate their agenda to match the so called public opinion. 
Or is it the other way round? 
Much of the discussion has been related with the wars - in the 
Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Congo or Georgia. There are plenty of 
other examples too. Italian media has been under constant monitoring, 
because of Premier minister Sylvio Berlusconi. His media enterprises are 
counted to cover two thirds of Italian media coverage and when he as a 
prime minister, has the authority to nominate the leaders of the state 
owned broadcasting company RAI, it is said that Mr. Berlusconi can use 
the media to support his political agenda. (Hanretty, Chris, The Gospel Truths 
of Italian Media Bias, Communicazione Politica vol. VIII n. 1 Primavera 2007) 
In Finland and in United Kingdom media have revealed 
malpractices in the way politicians are using public money. In Finland the 
question was weather the parties should tell where they get the money to 
run huge election campaigns, and in U.K. the headlines unfolded how the 
members of parliament had misused the expenditure compensation 
system. (Helsingin Sanomat, www.hs.fi) 
In Slovenia the political elite has been under investigation, because 
Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE argued in a programme that Finnish-
French defence company Patria has paid bribes to leading Slovenian 
ministers to win a 278 million euro public tender for 135 armoured 
personnel carriers. The investigation is still going on in Finland and in 
Slovenia. (Slovenian Press Agency STA, http://www.sta.si/en/vest.php?id=135 
6834&s=a) 
In all these cases politicians have claimed that media have too 
much power and influence, and that media is not only concentrating to 
publish the findings and facts but it is taking political sides too. 
It is obvious that the relationship between public authorities and 
media will remain tense and controversial in the future too. The 
development in the digital communication and social media will change 
the mass communication environment dramatically in the near future, and 
that will cause new coalitions. 
BBC World's news anchor Nik Goving writes in his new study that 
in the new millennium the institutions of power – governmental, political, 
military and corporate – face a new accurate vulnerability, because of the 
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technical digital development in communication techniques. Gowing talks 
about the new fast increasing and omniprecent breed of “information-
doers”. Gowing argues in his study that the unprecedented mass ability to 
bear witness and record dramatic, unfolding events on cheap, lightweight, 
go-anywhere technologies is defining a new, broader, almost infinite media 
matrix. Routinely it wrong foots and catches off guard the institutions of 
power in a crisis, leaving them open to both accusations, and the 
appearance, of failure. (Gowing, Nik, Skyful of Lies and Black Hawks, Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, 2009) 
In the United States journalists and scientists have for several years 
tried to determine what role media and journalists had while covering the 
events before the war broke out in Iraq in 2003 and during the aftermath 
of the war too. The debate has been closely connected with the campaign 
which president George W. Bush's and his administration called "the war 
against terrorism". 
Christian Science Monitor reviews in March 2008 article how the 
US media has portrayed the war, five years after the invasion of Iraq. 
(Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008 
/0319/p08s01-comv.html)  
Journal's article points out that mostly the media have done well, 
but media also played an unaware role in the discreet battle to influence 
public opinion. "Despite their best efforts to be credibly neutral and act as 
the eyes and ears on a distant war, journalists must also contend with 
efforts by both the Pentagon and insurgents in Iraq to practice what 
experts call "information operations," or IO – attempts to sway media 
reports".  
It seems obvious that even the opposite side – that is the 
insurgents in Iraq – have used the media to transmit their messages to the 
public too. A study made in Harvard University, indicates that the 
terrorists had a strategy when timing their bombs. When news of violence 
created a spike in US public debate from 2003 to 2007, the study found, 
insurgents increased attacks by 5 to 10 percent in an apparent attempt to 
influence that debate even more. (Iyengar, Radha and Monten, Jonathan, Is 
There an "Emboldenment" Effect? Evidence from the Insurgency in Iraq, Harvard, 
May 2008, http://people.rwj.harvard.edu/~riyengar/insurgency.pdf) 
The US government, too, have influenced how reporters frame the 
war's story line. 
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In my own study I found out that Time magazine – when writing 
about the Iraq war and when trying to justify the war – used anonymous 
government sources to give out confidential information, and in that way 
to support the war. During 2003-2006 Time published only few critical 
articles. The tendency was an overall, quite often even patriotic support, to 
the U.S. troops. (Laiho, Hannu-Pekka, The roles of different sources in Time 
magazine's Iraq war coverage  in 2003-2008, unpublished report, Helsinki) 
The press in U.S. and in some other coalition countries, already 
stands accused of not doing enough before the war to probe the Bush 
administration's arguments for the invasion, whether it was Saddam 
Hussein's alleged weapons or the prospects of implanting democracy in 
Iraq.  
According to Christian Science Monitor, journalists admit they 
relied too much on US officials and on military escorts for protection in 
gathering information. in a 2007 survey by the Pew Research Center of 
journalists who worked in Iraq, more than a third said their poorest 




Media – the fourth estate 
 
In traditional thinking, media are the fourth estate, three others 
being legislative power (the parliament), executive power (the cabinet) and 
jurisdiction (courts). Professor, PhD. Kaarle Nordenstreng, Tampere 
University, Finland, has reflected on the media's role in one of his lectures. 
Professor Nordenstreng sees media's role in relations to the authorities 
somehow complex. Media's role can be monitorial (a follower), facilitative 
(a contributor), radical (a convulser) or collaborative (an auxiliary). 
It is apparent that media have influence and power. This is why 
those in power have seen media as on opportunity to convey their 
messages – good and bad ones - via print and electronic media. 
During the last half a century the media coverage have been 
accused to have a great influence to the world history. Donald Humphreys 
writes in an article published on the Museum of Broadcast 
Communication web page that media in U.S. had a role, when the public 
turned against the Vietnam War. Weather it was because television, in 
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particular, and the media, in general, which presented it unfavourably, or 
whether the public turned against the war because media accurately 
depicted its horrors and television did so remains an open and hotly 
contested question in the public debate.  
Vietnam War was anyhow a trigger in the U.S. for the military and 
public relations strategists working with the politicians to start to 
investigate the role of the media in the formation of public opinion. As the 
war progressed, military analysts continued to debate whether it was 
appropriate for the military to attempt to influence civilian public policy 
through such efforts. Within military circles and in the wake of the 
Vietnam War, most such debates were left behind and media relations 
strategies went far beyond censorship and toward a full-fledged 
engagement (some say co-optation) of televised media. 
The much discussed interaction between military and television 
happened already during the first Gulf war - the U.S.-led 1991 Gulf War 
against Iraq. In the aftermath of that war, television and other media were 
criticized for having failed to provide a balanced and complete coverage of 
the war. Some critics argued that television and other media failed to 
provide a balanced and complete account of the war because the corporate 
owners of commercial networks felt it was not in their business interest to 
do so. Other critics suggest that television coverage simply reflects popular 
prejudices. To a great extent, however, during the actual war, as in 
previous wars, the various national media had to rely on the military forces 
for access to events and for access to their broadcast networks. (Hamphreys, 
Doland, War on television, The Museum on Broadcast Communication,  
http://www.museum.tv/eotvsection.php?entrycode=warontelevi) 
After the first Gulf war the media's role has been under heavy 
surveillance. Media's played a central role in the Balkan wars – in Slovenia 
1991, in Croatia 1991-95, in Bosnia Herzegovina 1992-95, in Serbia and 
Kosovo 1998-99. 
The civil war in Rwanda 1990-94 is one of the few examples where 
to role of journalists has been investigated. The news media played a 
crucial role in the 1994 Rwanda genocide: local media fuelled the killings, 
while the international media either ignored or seriously misconstrued 
what was happening. Local radio and print media were used as a tool of 
hate, encouraging neighbours to turn against each other. Rwanda genocide 
is one of the few wars where the accountability of  the media has been 
brought to court. Journalists in charge of the bias media coverage and hate 
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speeches were brought to International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
The tribunal has investigated the role of the media in the genocide. 
(Thompson, Allan, The Media and Rwanda Genocide, Pluto Press/Fountain 
Publishers, 2007) 
The war on terrorism (2001 – and still ongoing) and the second 
Iraq war (2003 – ongoing) have also been wars where media and 
journalists have played a central role. September the 11th 2001 – the New 
York Twin Tower attack – started a process in western world in which the 
media changed its traditional way of reporting. Especially American media 
turned to support the wars in a very patriotic way. The American flags, 
yellow ribbons and other national symbols appeared on TV news screens, 
major networks run programmes to support the American troops, and 
some eminent journalists were fired because they expressed critical 
comments. Peter Arnett – a well know correspondent for the CNN during 
the first Iraq war in 1991 – was fired from NBC because he questioned the 
U.S. role in the war and Phil Donahue and his prime time talk show was 
replaced in NBC by Keith Olbermann, because Donahue expressed critical 
views against president George W. Bush's Iraq policy. 
 
 
The Role of Media in Conflict – a peace maker or an 
agitator 
 
The power of journalism and the power of media are so frequently 
used terms that we seldom ask, what we do mean with the expression 
power of journalism.  
A Norwegian professor Martin Eide has for years made research 
on the role and power of media and journalists have in the society as well 
as on sociological aspects of news production. In an article published in 
Nordicom Review, Eide states that the power of journalism is decisive in 
the exercise of power and democracy in modern societies. Hardly any 
modern institution or social actor is untouched by the prevailing media 
logic. The professional ideology of journalism, the dramaturgical power of 
journalism and the particular role of modern popular journalism are 
considered. 
According to Eide the power of media and journalism is not power 
as such. Power is frequently conceptualised as a relational phenomenon. 
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Power is not a capacity that is possessed by an agent once and for all. 
Neither is it permanently anchored in certain social structures. Power 
appears in multiple and floating ways and typically displays itself through 
discourses and prevailing logic. Accordingly, journalism and the impact of 
journalistic logic on social actors’ courses of action should be of central 
interest in an updated social theory of power. 
In first hand, journalism has an importance to agenda-setting 
power.  Secondly, journalism is of relevance for the power implied in non-
decisions and issues that never reaches a public agenda. Thirdly, journalism 
is decisive in questions concerning ideology, hegemony and symbolic 
power. In short: None of these three dimensions of power can be properly 
understood if the role of journalism is neglected. (Eide, Martin, Nordicom 
Review, Encircling the Power of Journalism, 2007). 
Among many of the roles media have been offer, one is a peace 
maker. Quite many international organizations have been established, and 
a considerable amount of time and resources has been used to researches.  
Steven Livingston from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
says that international media sources such as the BBC, CNN, al Arabiya, 
and al Jazeera have global reach, and as such have an "agenda-setting 
effect." This effect, as Steven Livingston explained, revolves around the 
ideological components of political disagreements, and more specifically 
the way key actors in conflict seek to manipulate public perceptions of the 
disagreement. 
Actors in any conflict will seek to either minimize or exaggerate the 
conflict, depending upon their relative position of power. Weak actors will 
want to "socialize" the conflict—that is, to enlist allies in their cause 
against a greater power and to increase the perception of suffering. Actors 
in positions of dominance seek to "privatize" the conflict and limit 
attention to or awareness of the conflict. Those who are weak will seek to 
draw media coverage to the conflict while those who in power will seek to 
minimize the extent of the problems. (Bajraktari, Yll, The Role of Media in 
Conflict, The Unites States Institute of Peace,  http://www.usip.org/resources/role-
media-conflict). 
According to Livingston’s research, the amount of death and 
destruction does not correlate with the media attention the media. The 
international media seems a very random actor of conflict coverage. 
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Media's divisive role: case in the Balkans 
 
Kemal Kurspahic, the author of a book Prime Time Crime, Balkan 
media in War and Peace (USIP Press Books, 2003) and the former editor-
in-chef for the Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje 1988-94  said in his book, that 
the media’s actions in the Balkans are a prime example of how the media 
can be a source of antagonism and an instigator of conflict rather than a 
source for peace.  
Kurspahic claims that each side (Serbian and Croatian) propagated 
an "us versus them" mentality among their respective populations. The 
media went even so far that journalists invented crimes, flamed ethnic 
tensions and ruined peacemaking efforts  
by failing to objectively present views of the minority. In Belgrade, 
those who opposed the war were signalled out as traitors. Had their voices 
been heard, others might have been inspired to non-violent means of 
resistance and channels for negotiation could have opened before violence 
ensued.  
When Kurspahic investigates the media's role in Yugoslavia's 
collapse, he writes that the so called warlords in former Yugoslavia, led by 
Slobodan Milosevic, would not have succeeded unless a nationalist 
euphoria had not been generated in the first place. A key player in the 
creation of an environment, in which the country’s collapse occurred, is 
the media. Media cooperated with the nationalist elites, churches and 
religious communities. Kurspahic claims that every bullet and artillery shell 
fired, every fallen civilian, every concentration camp prisoner, and every 
destroyed cultural and historical monument, was preceded by careful 
media preparation. 
People coming from outside of former Yugoslavia – like I did in 
1992 – had great difficulties to understand for example the Serbian TV 
coverage and programming. I watched in Zagreb Serbian TV, and 
programmes from Serbian part of Bosnia Herzegovina for several months 
before the former Yugoslav TV transmitters were turned off. 
The role of Orthodox Church and the priests in the war 
propaganda was central. Same applied to academics and nationalistic 
opinion leaders.  
Serbia foremost, but also Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
whose media Kurspahic analyzes in his book, became models of societies 
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in which professional immorality and irresponsibility served nationalistic 
goals. 
As Kurspahic writes, “Once the demons of the Balkans’ myths and 
history had been unleashed, flooding the newspaper pages and radio and 
television programs with horrifying stories of once-good neighbours as 
dangerous enemies, the nationalist controlled media became instigators—
not just witnesses—of terror, killings and exodus of genocide proportions. 
The front pages of newspapers and evening television newscasts churned 
out a nightmarish years-long prime time crime.” 
Due to the Kurspahic’s Sarajevo background, his book is not 
maybe the most balanced description of the events the Balkans, but it 
gives a frightening picture on the roles media played in all former Yugoslav 
states during 35-year long rule of President Josip Broz Tito, after his death 
1980s and especially during the 1990s when the war broke out. 
 
 
Unbalanced, uneven development in Yugoslavia's 
federal states during the 1980s 
 
When one gets acquainted with the recent Yugoslav history, many 
observers take up the development during the 1980s as the key to 
understand why the country slides to a civil war.  President Tito died in 
1980, but the signs that the division of power after him might be 
challenging, were visible already years before. 
If we investigate the development from the media's angle, it is true 
that some incidents predicted that an internal conflict might have been 
evolving, but evolution for example in Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia was 
uneven. 
It was not easy for the journalists to alter the way they have 
worked under the communist regime. It was even more complicated to the 
old party leaders to understand what was happening with the institutions 
they had control for decades. 
Professors Stjepan Malovic and Gary W. Selnow describe the 
development in Yugoslav states in details in their book The People, Press 
and Politics of Croatia, Peager 2001. Total confusion spread in the society 
as well to the newsrooms. Some advanced journalists understood what 
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media freedom is all about, but many continued to rely on the old, safe 
communist structures and procedures. When the whole socialistic Eastern 
Europe was shaking and changing, people understood that something will 
happen in Yugoslavia too. Voices of wider independence for federal states 
where mixed with nationalistic demands and accusations.  
There was great concern, that the dawning freedom of the media 
will be destroyed, when journalist didn't act in a responsible way. Professor 
Davor Robin from Zagreb University is quoted in the Malovic-Selnow 
book by saying "We are loosing media freedom, when journalists attack, 
insult, lie and twist the truth about the past, present and the future". 
Professor Robin's only hope was the free public, which can save the 
freedom. 
In communist Yugoslavia journalism was understood to be a part 
of the political environment. Journalists were regarded as social-political 
workers, who supported the goals of the regime. When dissident 
journalists tried to enjoy their freedom, they were silenced by the party. 
The Yugoslav state structures were staggering and politicians did 
not find common ground to proceed. It was important to all federal 
leaders to guarantee that their own ethnic groups supported them. One 
tool in this was nationalism. 
Researcher Mikko Jokela, Jyvaskyla University, Finland, studied in 
his master thesis the Serbian heritage and the nationalistic politics which 
took the power from the past. He concluded that this policy was one of 
the major reasons why Yugoslavia entered to a civil war. The manipulation 
was lead by Slobodan Milosevic, who in 1986 rose to the leadership of the 
Serbian League of Communists, soon after the document known as the 
Memorandum of Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts was published. 
The document consisted of a long list of Serb grievances and 
discrimination against Serbs. 
Slobodan Milosevic managed to convince his own nation and 
people that Serbia has always been a victim. The Serbian people have 
according to Milosevic nationalistic politic lived for centuries in agony, 
suffering during the invasions of Ottomans and others. Milosevic’s media 
machine succeeded to convince ethnic Serbs that they faced imminent 
danger from their fellow citizens in other former Yugoslav republics and 
provinces. 
Mikko Jokela concludes that towards the end of 1980s, many 
liberal journalists in Serbia, lost their job and an atmosphere of fear helped 
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Milosevic to strengthen his grip on the media.  Milosevic fully understood 
the power of media and the importance of exerting control over it. 
Especially the Serbian radio and television and the Politika newspaper 
were the strongholds for the probaganda. According to Warren 
Zimmerman, the last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Milosevic met 
with the head of Belgrade Radio-Television every day. (Jokela, Mikko, 
Serbian menneisyyspolitiikka 1980- ja 90-luvuilla, Jyvaskyla university, 2002). 
Situation in Croatia was different. In a workshop - Freedom 
without responsibility or responsibility without freedom - organized in 
September 2009 at the Zadar University, department of tourism and 
communication science, participants stated that the development in 
Croatia compared with the situation in Serbia was much different. All the 
participants were eminent Croatian journalists who worked in the 
newspapers and radio-television. In early 1980s, even towards the end of 
1980s, no one thought that they would face a cruel civil war at the 
beginning of 1990s. 
There was much happening in the Croatian media and media 
structures too, but somehow journalists did not feel that the political grip 
was strengthening. There were some nationalistic developments, but even 
the memorandum by Serbian Academy of Science and Arts and Slobodan 
Milosevic famous speech in Kosovo Polje and the demonstrations were 
seen in other parts of Yugoslavia more like an internal Serbian issue. 
The Serbian television's emotional, patriotic journalism influenced 
the Serbians living in other parts of Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia and 
Bosnia Herzegovina. The federal states elections in 1990 – still held under 
old Yugoslav law – brought to power politicians who favoured 
independence and did not support the Yugoslav collective. This caused 
tension among the Serbs in Croatia and they organized demonstrations in 
August 1990 in the middle of best Adriatic holiday season. Foreign tourists 
escaped from the coast, the police in Croatia was not strong enough to 
stop the unrest. Serbs had arms and some people were killed. 
Serbian television supported strongly the demonstrators and the 
coverage from Belgrade was seen as very biased. The Zadar university 
workshop participants claimed that it was very clear that the leaders of 
Croatian Serbs got constantly instructions from Milosevic lead Serbian 
regime. There were several examples when the opinions and movement of 
the crowds were almost like "remote controlled". At the same time the 
Croatian authorities were trying to form a functioning administration 
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because most of the Yugoslav structures were breaking up. There were no 
proper police force, military was under Serbian command, many media 
outlets were without leadership. (The Zadar university panel discussion consisted 
of media professionals, scientists and journalists Davorka Mezic, Elsa Radulic, 
Bozidar Simunic, Toni Pajkin, Bozidar Klaric, Zvanko Kucelin, Nedjeljko Jusup, 
Josip Vidakovis and Stjepan Malovic). 
 
 
Television – a propaganda weapon? 
 
The role of media and the propaganda in former Yugoslavia has 
been investigated and reported for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia. The 97-pages report was written for the so called 
Haag Tribunal by a French professor Renaud de la Brosse from the 
University of Reims, Champagne, Ardennes, France. The report is a part 
of the material which was used during the Slobodan Milosevic case. 
In both the Croatia and Bosnia indictments, one of Milosevic's 
alleged contributions to a joint criminal enterprise to ethnically cleanse 
large areas of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was his use of the Serbian 
state media to create an atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs by 
spreading "exaggerated and false messages of ethnically based attacks by 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats against Serb people."  
De la Brosse writes that Milosevic began his efforts to control 
audio-visual media in 1986-87 and the process was finished in summer 
1991. "The media offensive launched by Belgrade contributed to the 
appearance of equally detestable propaganda in other Yugoslav republics 
and its after-effects would be felt for years," the report said, quoting 
former Reuters Sarajevo correspondent Daniel Deluce. De la Brosse 
claims the Serbian authorities used the media as a weapon in their military 
campaign. "In Serbia specifically, the use of media for nationalist ends and 
objectives formed part of a well-thought through plan - itself part of a 
strategy of conquest and affirmation of identity".  Milosevic' propaganda 
was effective, in part, because the society was in transition from. An 
ideology that largely defined people for 50 years, was vanishing. The 
nationalist ideology, dating back even 600 years – mixed with historical 
legends, partly based on facts, partly on fiction - provided an answer.  
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By the early Nineties, an extremist element of rising Croatian 
nationalism fed the flames of fear, especially in Serb majority regions of 
Croatia, by rehabilitating Ustashe symbols. The new Serbian identity 
became one in opposition to the "other" - Croats (collapsed into Ustashe) 
and Muslims (collapsed into "Turks").  
The report says Milosevic's propaganda campaign was based on the 
same techniques as used by Adolf Hitler, with the added power of 
television. "Nazi propaganda had shown that myths bind the masses 
together tightly. Indeed, it was through myths and, therefore, the appeal to 
the forces of the unconscious, to fear and terror, the instinct of power and 
the lost community that the propaganda orchestrated by Goebbels had 
succeeded in winning over the Germans and melding them into a compact 
mass." 
Serbian television and radio's repetitive use of pejorative 
descriptions, such as "Ustashe hordes", "Vatican fascists", "Mujahedin 
fighters", "fundamentalist warriors of Jihad", and "Albanian terrorists", 
quickly became part of common usage.  
Unverified stories, presented as fact, were turned into common 
knowledge - for example, that Bosnian Muslims were feeding Serb children 
to animals in the Sarajevo zoo. In these stories, friends and neighbours, 
fellow countrymen and women were turned into "the other", lacking 
humanising or individual characteristics.  
Another example of misleading information was a television 
broadcast of corpses, described as Serb civilians killed by Croats, which are 
believed to be in fact the bodies of Croats killed by Serbs. De la Brosse 
described how Radio Television Serbia, RTS, portrayed events in 
Dubrovnik and Sarajevo, "The images shown of Dubrovnik came with a 
commentary accusing those from the West who had taken the film of 
manipulation and of having had a tyre [sic] burnt in front of their cameras 
to make it seem that the city was on fire.  
"As for the shells fired at Sarajevo and the damage caused, for 
several months it was simply as if it had never happened in the eyes of 
Serbian television viewers because Belgrade television would show pictures 
of the city taken months and even years beforehand to deny that it had 
ever occurred."  
According to the report the Serbian public got same kind of 
misleading information about Vukovar. "Serbian Radio Television created 
a strange universe in which Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, had never been 
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besieged and in which the devastated Croatian town of Vukovar had been 
'liberated'."  
For the print media, Milosevic's methods were different. He 
allowed the independent press to publish, but the distribution was 
extremely limited. Milosevic controlled the press by limiting the usage of 
paper, equipments and demanding special licences or fining the publishers.  
According to the de la Brosse report, official Serbian propaganda 
reached more than 3.5 million people every night. That was even more 
effective, because public did not have alternative sources for information. 
(Brosse de la, Renaud, Political Propaganda and the Plan to Cresate a "State for all 
Serbs", Consequences of using the Media for Ultra Nationalists Ends, report can be 
found from 
http://hague.bard.edu/reports/de_la_brosse_pt1.pdf or 




Journalists to court in Serbia 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 
Haag has prosecuted political and military leader from former Yugoslavia, 
but the possible crimes conducted by journalists haven't been investigated. 
Now the Serbia's war crimes prosecutor has a plan to investigate 
the role of media in spreading ethnic hatred and encouraging war crimes 
during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. The prosecutor announced his 
plans in late June 2009, in Belgrade trials on the massacre of 200 Croats at 
the Ovcara farm near Vukovar in 1991 and the murder of 25 Bosniaks in 
Zvornik in 1992. The men accused for the crimes told in the court that 
certain reports from electronic media incited them to commit the crimes. 
In an article published by the Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting (IWPR), many Balkan experts express their doubt, that the case 
will proceed to the court.   
Filip David, former editor of drama programmes at Serbian state 
TV said in the IWPR interview that "it's late because so much time has 
passed, many have died or have been forgotten, and it's early, because 
many of those who were then orchestrating media are still in power, in 
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politics, and are still indirectly influencing media through the political 
parties they are in". 
Vildana Selimbegovic, editor-in-chief at Sarajevo daily 
Oslobodjenje, states in the same report that "the initiative of the Serbian 
prosecution has come somewhat late. Some of those people have already 
returned to TV stations and press, forgetting what they did. But it would 
not be good that this turns into a witch hunt or personal confrontations. I 
am afraid there is a possibility that this could happen."  
Professor Gordana Vilovic, an expert on the media in Croatia, said 
she was surprised at the news from Belgrade but thought the probe was a 
"great step forward", although it might be difficult to carry it through to 
the end. "Thinking about what would happen if this investigation took 
place in Croatia, I concluded that Croatia is still not mature enough to face 
things from the past, especially from the beginning of the war when the 
words of hatred were best heard," said Vilovic. (IWPR, Serbia Probes 






Europe saw big political changes in 1989 and the Federal State of 
Yugoslavia was soon falling apart. In the war - which started in 1991 and 
continued ten years – tens of thousands people lost their life or wounded. 
Still thousands of former Yugoslav citizens are living in exile or as refugees 
in the Balkans. It will take still many years before the region overcomes the 
war and misery. 
Some would think that people have learned the lessons, and that 
the media and journalists are looking for the ways how to build up a safe 
and tolerant region. 
In that context the recent headlines are staggering. According to 
the news, Bosnia Herzegovina is "on the brink of a new civil war". The 
political leaders of the Republica Serbska want to have independence for 
their part of Bosnia Herzegovina. (Daily telegraph, Oct 19, 2009, Bosnia is 
heading for a new civil war, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/6364680/Bosnia-on-
brink-of-new-civil-war.html#) 
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The situation in the other unstable part of former Yugoslavia – 
that is Kosovo – remains tense too. The UN envoy Lamberto Zannier told 
the UN Security Council in October 2009 that, "although the situation in 
Kosovo has remained generally stable, the situation in the northern part of 
the territory remains an issue of concern. In August when the situation 
threatened to get out of hand, as tensions increased between local Serbs 
and Albanians, in a suburb of Mitrovica, UNMIK helped defuse the 
situation." (UN envoy says situation in northern Kosovo remains a concern, Oct. 15, 
2009, http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/83923.html)  
 
 
